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What Is a Belief State? 
Curtis Brown 
What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts 
about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our 
beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be 
divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the 
individual’s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the 
individual’s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic 
community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within each noninternal 
psychological state that enters into the explanation of some action or behavior 
we can locate an ‘internal core state’ which can assume the causal-explanatory 
role of the noninternal state."2 In the same vein, Stephen Stich writes that 
"nonautonomous" states, like belief, are best viewed as "conceptually complex 
hybrids" made up of an autonomous component together with historical and 
contextual features.3 John Perry, whose term I have adopted, distinguishes 
between belief states, which are determined by an individual’s intrinsic 
properties, and objects of belief, which are not.4 And Daniel Dennett makes use 
of the same notion when he asks:5 
What, then, is the organismic contribution to the fixation of propositional 
attitudes? How shall we characterize what we get when we subtract facts about 
context or embedding from the determining whole? This remainder, however 
we ought to characterize it, is the proper domain of psychology, ‘pure’ 
psychology, or in Putnam’s phrase, ‘psychology in the narrow sense’. 
I propose to explore the notion of a belief state. In section I, I will propose an 
account of the idea of a belief state that is neutral with respect to such questions 
as how belief states are best characterized and whether they play a central role 
in psychology or epistemology. In section II, I use this account to describe 
some recent positions in the philosophy of psychology as sharing the notion of 
a belief state but disagreeing about the nature of belief states. The remaining 
sections develop my own preferred account of how best to characterize belief 
states. The account I favor takes belief states to be relations between people and 
semantic or intensional objects. Section III explains why propositions will not 
do for this purpose: depending on how we specify the relevant propositions, 
there will either be too many to characterize belief states completely or too few 
to characterize them essentially. Following David Lewis and Roderick 
Chisholm, I suggest that belief states are best characterized by properties. 
Finally, section IV sketches an account of how the properties that characterize 
one’s belief state are determined by one’s intrinsic properties. The account of 
belief states defended in sections III and IV is an important part of a larger 
account of belief proper – an account that, however, can only be hinted at here. 
I 
I shall assume without defense that the objects of belief are propositions, and in 
particular that if a sentence of the form ‘Joe believes that S’ is true, then the 
proposition expressed by S is an object of Joe’s belief. I believe that this view is 
correct,6 but it is certainly a minority view. Those who reject it may want to 
regard it here as merely a simplifying assumption; it should be possible to adapt 
my account of the notion of a belief state to any view according to which 
beliefs have objects (whether propositions or something else) that are 
determined (in some not necessarily straightforward way) by the ‘that’-clauses 
of true ascriptions of belief. 
Dennett’s helpful term ‘organismic contribution to belief’ suggests two 
conditions that must be met for something to be a belief state. First, a belief 
state is an organismic contribution to belief: it is the organism’s contribution to 
belief, not the environment’s. We might put this by saying that one’s belief 
state depends only on one’s intrinsic properties. An "intrinsic property" of an 
organism is one that involves only facts solely about the organism. Facts about 
the organism’s environment are wholly irrelevant to its intrinsic properties. 
Seeing an apple does not depend only on intrinsic properties of an organism, 
since whether one sees an apple depends not only on facts solely about one’s 
body, but also on whether one’s environment includes an apple. For precisely 
the same reason, believing a singular proposition about something in one’s 
environment does not depend only on one’s intrinsic properties. Further, the 
belief state of an organism at a time should involve only properties of the 
organism at that time. Thus we have condition I: the belief state of an organism 
at a time should supervene on the intrinsic properties of the organism at that 
time. 
Second, a belief state is an organismic contribution to belief. One believes the 
things one does because of the total state one is in. But not every facet of one’s 
total state contributes to determining what one believes. One’s belief state does 
not depend on facts about one, such as whether one’s body has an odd or even 
number of water molecules, which make no contribution to what one believes. 
The notion of a belief state must be such as to allow that if all the intrinsic facts 
about me were exactly as they are except that my left big toe contained one less 
water molecule, I would be in the same belief state I am in fact in. Thus we 
have condition 2: a belief state must be a state of the organism that depends 
only on those facts about the organism that are relevant to what it believes. 
Both of these requirements rule that certain facts are irrelevant to what belief 
state one is in. They give information about the conditions under which one is 
in a particular belief state. 
Suppose that I am at the moment in a particular belief state. Under what 
circumstances would I be in this belief state? We know already of one set of 
circumstances in which I am in it: the actual one. But there are more. Some 
conditions met by my present circumstances do not need to be met for me to be 
in the same belief state. If we rule that certain facts about my present situation 
are irrelevant to what belief state I am in, we thereby increase the number of 
circumstances in which I would be in int. 
Some such facts are ruled out by the first condition. Only facts solely about me 
are relevant to what belief state I am in. No matter how the facts about my 
environment alter, as long as the intrinsic facts about me remain the same, my 
belief state remains the same. According to the first condition, then, I would be 
in the same belief state in all those circumstances in which, however different 
my environment might be, the intrinsic facts about me remain the same. 
The second condition relaxes the conditions on my being in the same belief 
state still further. Not all the intrinsic facts about me are relevant: just those 
facts a difference in which would involve a difference in what I believe. Thus 
the circumstances in which I would be in the same belief state include not only 
those in which my environment differs but also those in which the intrinsic 
facts about me differ in ways that do not affect what I believe. 
Let us now try to make this intuitive picture a little more precise. I will employ 
some quasi-technical abbreviations that are admittedly no more precise than the 
English expressions they abbreviate. Nevertheless, they are helpful because the 
complexity of the account, despite the simplicity of its basic idea, makes it 
difficult to state unambiguously in ordinary English. 
I begin by dividing the world up in a mildly unusual way. The facts that 
determine what an individual believes divide into facts solely about the 
individual and facts about the individual’s environment or situation. So we 
need to theoretical notions. First, we need the notion of the total intrinsic state, 
or simply "total state" for short, of a person, at a time, in a world. Let ‘TS’ be a 
variable over total intrinsic states, and let ‘TS(x,t,w)’ denote the TS of person x, 
at time t, in world w. For vividness only, I will think of a total state as a 
concrete, momentary, physical entity. (We could almost think of a total state as 
a time-world slice of an individual. But not quite: the facts about a total state do 
not include facts about whose state it is. TS(me, now, the actual world) is the 
very same total state as TS(Twin Curtis, now, the actual world), although our 
current time-world slices are different.) 
Our second notion is that of a situation. The situation of x, at t, in w – S(x,t,w) – 
is the sum of the intrinsic facts about x’s environment up to t, including the 
environment’s and x’s own past history. S(x,t,w) includes all the intrinsic facts 
about w, up to and including time t, except those that constitute TS(x,t,w). 
Again for vividness, I will think of a situation as a concrete physical entity. If 
possible worlds are thought of as concrete, we can get the situation 
of x at t in w by taking w, cutting off everything after t, and then cutting out the 
stage of xat t. 
A TS and an S together determine a set of propositions P. Let P(TS,S) be the 
set of those propositions P such that, for all x, necessarily, if x is in TS and x’s 
situation is S, then x believes P. If we ignore complications introduced because 
situations contain facts about a world only up to a certain time, and we think of 
situations and total states as concrete building blocks, then we can visualize 
P(TS,S) as follows: TS and S fit together to form a world, and P is the set of 
propositions believed in that world by the person of whom TS is a slice (at the 
time of the gap into which TS was inserted). 
Recall Putnam’s Twin Earth example.7 I believe that water is wet; but were I on 
Putnam’s Twin Earth in the very same TS I am in fact in, I would believe 
instead that XYZ is wet. The very same TS, embedded in different contexts, 
warrants different belief ascriptions. We might diagram this situation as shown 
in the accompanying figure (letting ‘ts1’ name a particular total state, the one I 
am in now). Here, s1 is a particular situation – my actual situation, let us say. 
Then p1 is the set of propositions that my actual total intrinsic state, ts1, 
determines in s1; that is, p1 = P(tis1, s1). Assuming, as seems plausible, that my 
total state together with all the facts about my environment, including my own 
past history, determines all the things I believe, 8 p1 will be the set of all the 
things I actually believe. Thus p1includes the proposition that water is wet, but 
not the proposition that XYZ is wet. 
 Now s2 is another situation – perhaps the situation of my Twin Earth 
counterpart. p2 is then the set of propositions determined by my actual total 
state, ts1, together with that situation. p2 will be the set of propositions believed 
by my Twin Earth counterpart – including the proposition that XYZ is wet, but 
not the proposition that water is wet. 
The list of situations is then extended to include all the situations, actual and 
possible, into which ts1 could be fitted. (The list will include, for example, a 
counterfactual situation in which I myself grow up on a planet where XYZ fills 
the lakes. The set of propositions determined by ts1 and that situation will be 
like p2 and unlike p1 in containing the proposition that water is wet; but it will 
be like p1 and unlike p2 in containing the proposition that I, CB, am named 
‘Curtis’. Instead, p2 contains the proposition that Twin Curtis is named 
‘Curtis’.) 
Now, condition 1 says that I am in the same belief state, no matter what 
situation I am in, provided that I am in ts1. But according to condition 2, there 
are also other total states that I (or others) could be in and be in the same belief 
state: namely, all those total states that make no difference to my beliefs. A 
total state would make a difference to my beliefs if there were some situation in 
which it led to different propositions believed. So those total states that make 
no difference to what I believe are those for which there is no situation in 
which they produce different propositions believed that ts1: namely, all those 
TS such that P(TS,s1) = p1, P(TS,s2) = p2, . . ., P(TS,sn) = pn. 
The belief state I am actually in, then, is the state anyone would be in if and 
only if they were in one of the total intrinsic states just described. For at least 
some, and perhaps all, purposes we could simply identify this state with the 
corresponding set of total intrinsic states, just as for at least some and perhaps 
all purposes we can identify the property of being wooden with the set of all 
actual and possible wooden things. We can then generalize our account as 
follows: the belief state of individual x, at time t, and in world w – BS(x,t,w) – 
is the set of all those TS such that: for all S, if P(TS(x,t,w),S) = Q, then P(TS,S) 
= Q. In something closer to English, x’s belief state (at time t and in world w) is 
the set of total states that determine, with respect to any situation, the same 
propositions x’s total state (at t and in w) determines with respect to that 
situation. 
My belief state, then, is determined as follows. First, consider the total state I 
am actually in. Next, consider what beliefs that TS would give me (or others) in 
all situations of interest. Finally, consider the set of all the TS’s that would 
produce exactly the same beliefs as my actual TS, no matter what they 
situation. This set of TS’s is my belief state. 
So my current belief state is the set of all those total states that would produce, 
in my actual situation, the belief that water is wet (but not the belief that XYZ 
is wet), together with all the other beliefs I have in the actual situation, and 
would produce, in the Twin-Earth situation, the belief that SYZ is wet (but not 
that water is wet), together with all the other beliefs of my Twin-Earth 
counterpart. 
It may be helpful to compare my belief state with my weight state. Consider 
first the TS I am actually in. Next, consider what weights that TS would 
produce in all situations of interest (on the Earth, on the Moon, if the Earth 
were twice as big, etc.). Finally, consider the set of TS’s that would produce the 
same weights as my actual TS, no matter what the situation. Some of these will 
specify shortness and fatness, some tallness and slenderness; some will specify 
that their possessor be made of flesh, some that it be made of stone. The set of 
all of them is my weight state. Or, perhaps more clearly, what they all share and 
nothing else does is my weight state. 
As it happens, weight states are very interesting and important for physics, for a 
particular weight state is just the property of having a particular mass. Belief 
states may turn out to be as important for psychology as weight states are for 
physics. But nothing said so far guarantees that they will be. There may be 
nothing of interest shared by all and only the total states that make up one’s 
belief state. Belief states as here defined would still exist, but would be of no 
systematic importance – like the scattered object consisting of my left thumb 
and a certain beetle in Africa, or like the property of being a Virgo. 
II 
We have reached an account of what it could mean to talk about "belief states" 
or about the "organismic contribution to belief." A good deal of recent 
discussion can be understood as addressed, more or less explicitly, to the 
question how best to characterize belief states so understood, or what the nature 
of belief states is. We have thought of one’s belief state as a set of total intrinsic 
states: those states, roughly, in which one would believe the same things as in 
one’s actual state, no matter what the circumstances. The question of what the 
nature of a belief state is might then be understood as the question of what, if 
anything, these total intrinsic states have in common besides the fact that one 
believes the same things in each of them. If they do share something 
interesting, then it will seem plausible that it is in virtue of that something that a 
person in a given belief state believes the things she or he does. 
An analogy may help make this clear. We can pick out a certain collection of 
physical states of material objects as those states that produce in us the 
sensation of red; and we might then call the whole collection the "state of being 
red." If all the states in the collection (and no others) share some interesting 
feature, then it will seem reasonable to say that it is because of that feature that 
objects appear red to us, and redness will seem to be an intrinsic property of 
objects. If the states do not share such a feature, then it will seem that the "state 
of being red" is a gerrymandered state hardly deserving the name at all; redness 
will seem to be irreducibly a relational property, a property an object has just in 
case it affects people in a certain way. 
Similarly, if the physical states comprised by a given belief state (and no 
others) share some interesting feature, then it will seem natural to say that it is 
in virtue of possessing that feature that one believes the things one does, and 
belief will seem to be an intrinsic property of individuals. If they do not, then 
"belief states" will seem hardly to bed states at all, and belief will seem to be 
irreducible relational. 
If there is an intrinsic property of redness, then it will be reasonable to say that 
if things had been different – if people had been constructed differently – 
redness might have looked blue; if not, there will seem to be a necessary 
connection between being red and looking red. Similarly, it will seem natural to 
say that one’s belief that P might not have been a belief that P just in case there 
is an intrinsic property of individuals in virtue of which they believe the things 
they do. 
Recent views about the nature of belief states divide into three groups. First, it 
may be that they simply have no nature: the various total states that constitute a 
belief state may share nothing but some long, disjunctive physical property. 
The "organismic contribution" to belief may simply not be interesting by itself, 
just as the object’s contribution to redness may not be interesting by itself. This 
seems to be the view of Gareth Evans9 and of some Wittgensteinian writers;10 it 
also seems to be the view of those who think that cognitive psychology needs 
to devise its own theoretical terms and that these will have no interesting 
connection with the folk psychological notion of belief. This view is held by 
Paul and Patricia Churchland 11 and is entertained seriously by Stich.12 Second, 
it may be that what the states that constitute the belief state share is somehow 
specifiable formally or syntactically, as a elation between the believer and a 
sentence in a "language of thought." This seems to be the view of Jerry Fodor 
and Hartry Field,13 and is entertained by Stich, who calls it the "modified 
Panglossian prospect." 14 Finally, it may be that belief states are best 
characterized as relations to semantically defined objects such as propositions 
or properties. This sort of view is at least suggested by work of Robert 
Stalnaker and David Lewis,15 and it is a view of this sort that I propose to 
explore. 
The most obvious candidates for semantic objects that characterize our belief 
states are the propositions we believe. But these propositions clearly do not 
characterize our belief states essentially. That is the moral of examples like 
Putnam’s: since I could be in the same belief state but believe different 
propositions, the propositions I in fact believe are not essential to my belief 
state. This is one reason why many have found the view that belief states are 
best characterized by semantic objects implausible. 
But it would be fainthearted to abandon the idea of a semantic characterization 
for this reason. Granted, the same belief state yields different propositions 
believed in different situations. It may nevertheless e that there 
are some propositions that a given belief state determines in every situation, and 
it may be that these provide the characterization we seek. 
The leading idea of the account of belief I favor is that of an immediate object 
of belief. Among the things I believe, some are believed indirectly or mediately. 
The belief that water is wet, the belief that I am married to Karen, the belief 
that Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Ethics – all these I believe indirectly, 
since I could be in the same belief state and yet not believe them. Had I grown 
up on Twin Earth calling XYZ ‘water’ I would now believe that XYZ is wet, 
not that water is. Some of my beliefs, then, differ between the actual situation 
and the counterfactual one. But surely others of my beliefs hold constant across 
them, and surely it is in virtue of some of these more constant beliefs – such as 
the belief that the odorless substance that fills the lakes and is called ‘water’ is 
wet – that I believe in the one situation that water is wet, and in the other that 
XYZ is wet. I suggest that there are some propositions that I believe in every 
situation in which I am in the same belief state; and that it is in virtue of 
believing these, together with the varying facts of the situations I could find 
myself in, that I believe in those situations the rest of the propositions I believe 
in them. These constant propositions are the immediate objects of belief. 
We can define the notion of an immediate object of belief as follows. A 
proposition P is a (partial) immediate object of (say) Joe’s belief just in case, 
for any possible situation S, if Joe is in the same belief state in S he is actually 
in, then Joe believes P in S. One’s total immediate object of belief is then 
simply the collection of all one’s partial immediate objects of belief. 
Suppose we want to find an illuminating and helpful way to characterize belief 
states by means of semantic objects. What is it exactly that we want? I suggest 
that it is a means of determining, given only intrinsic facts about an individual, 
a set of semantic objects such that: (1) anyone in the same belief state will 
determine the same objects – that is, the objects characterize the belief 
state essentially; (2) no one in a different belief state determines exactly the 
same objects – that is, the objects characterize the belief state completely; and 
(3) the facts about these special objects, together with the facts about one’s 
environment, determine the facts about what one believes in that environment. 
My initial hope was that the semantic objects that would meet these conditions 
would be propositions – in particular, the immediate objects of belief. But it 
appears that no set of propositions can satisfy both (1) and (2). So the account I 
will offer is slightly more complex. 
This account involves two related notions. The first is the notion of an 
immediate object of belief. The second, adapted from David Lewis and 
Roderick Chisholm, 16 is the notion of the property (immediately) self-ascribed 
by an individual. The total property self-ascribed by an individual is what 
essentially and completely characterizes the individual’s belief state. One’s 
total immediate object of belief characterizes one’s being in a particular belief 
state rather than the belief state itself; and it determines, in conjunction with 
contextual features, the rest of one’s beliefs. But the two are intimately 
connected: from one’s total immediate object of belief it is possible t recover 
one’s total self-ascribed property; and one’s total self-ascribed property, 
together with who (and when) one is, determines one’s total immediate object 
of belief. 
In the remainder of this paper I will do two things. In section III I will explain 
why it seems impossible to find a set of propositions that characterize one’s 
belief state both essentially and completely. Reflection on this difficulty will 
lead to the notion of a self-ascribed property as what best characterizes one’s 
belief state. In section IV, I will sketch an account of how one’s intrinsic 
properties determine one’s total self-ascribed property. 
III 
One’s total immediate object of belief, as I have defined it, does not 
characterize one’s belief state essentially. I believe that I am named ‘Curtis’. 
Very likely I would believe this in any situation in which I were in the same 
belief state I am actually in, so the proposition that I am named ‘Curtis’ is an 
immediate object of my belief. Nevertheless, although I cannot be in this belief 
state without believing that I am named ‘Curtis’, someone else can be. My 
Twin Earth counterpart is in exactly the same belief state I am in, but does not 
believe that I am named ‘Curtis’ – indeed, he has no beliefs about me at all. So 
although my being in this beliefs state is essentially characterized by the 
proposition that I am named ‘Curtis’, the belief state itself is not. Of course, if 
any partial immediate object does not characterize my belief state essentially, 
neither does my total immediate object of belief. 
The definition of ‘immediate object of belief’ could be modified so as to avoid 
this result. We could say that an immediate object of my belief is a proposition 
which anyone in my belief state would believe in any situation. But given this 
definition, my total immediate object of belief does not characterize my belief 
state completely. 
For consider: Twin Curtis and I are in the same belief state. I believe that I am 
named ‘Curtis’, but not that Twin Curtis is; Twin Curtis believes that he is 
named ‘Curtis’ but not that I am. There must be something about the belief 
state we share in virtue of which we believe these different propositions. If our 
belief state can be completely characterized by means of immediate objects of 
belief, then there must be some immediate object of belief that we share and in 
virtue of which we indirectly believe these different propositions. But it seems 
that there is no such proposition. 
The needed proposition cannot be the proposition that the sentence "I am 
named ‘Curtis’" is true: I know that the sentence is true or false only relative to 
context. Do I believe that the proposition the sentence expresses in the present 
context is true? Let us pas over for the moment problems about direct belief of 
singular propositions about the present time. There are many different present 
contexts – for instance, one for me and a different one for Twin Curtis. So 
perhaps what I really believe is that the sentence "I am named ‘Curtis’" is true 
in the context I am now in. but then our semantic ascent has accomplished 
nothing. This cannot be the proposition both Twin Curtis and I believe in virtue 
of which each of us believes that he is named ‘Curtis’: Twin Curtis does not 
believe that he is named ‘Curtis’ in virtue of believing that the sentence "I am 
named ‘Curtis’ is true in the context I am now in. 
We were evidently wrong to think that the immediate belief we seek is 
metalinguistic. It might be thought instead that Twin Curtis and I each believe 
that the unique person who satisfies a certain description is named ‘Curtis’. But 
surely we don’t, for we acknowledge that any description we immediately 
believe we satisfy may be satisfied by someone else as well. Nor does each of 
us believe that he is named ‘Curtis’ in virtue of believing that all people who 
satisfy some description are named ‘Curtis’, for any description I immediately 
believe I satisfy could be satisfied by someone who is not really named 
‘Curtis’, and I am aware of this. 
If we now take the subjects of attitudes to be persona stages rather than people 
proper, we may construct similar examples involving different stages of the 
same person rather than different people. I will present an example showing 
that if we do not allow singular propositions about oneself (where ‘oneself’ 
may refer to a temporal stage of a person), we cannot find propositions in virtue 
of immediately believing which we believe indirectly some singular 
propositions about the present time. 
Consider first an example that might be thought not to work. In situation 1, 
Andrea believes, at t1, that it is then raining. In (counterfactual) situation 2, 
Andrea is in exactly the same belief state as in situation 1, but she believes at t2, 
a different time than t1, that it is then raining. In situation 1, Andrea does not 
immediately believe the proposition that it is raining at t1, since she is in the 
same belief state in situation 2 but does not believe that proposition. If we are 
to characterize her belief state, we need something that stays constant across 
situations 1 and 2. 
Let S be the sentence ‘It is now raining’, P1 be the proposition that it is raining 
at t1, and P2 be the proposition that it is raining at t2. If Andrea’s belief state can 
be characterized in terms of propositions, then there must be a proposition Q 
that she believes in both situations and in virtue of which she believes P1 in 
S1 and P2 in S2. 
In most such examples, it is plausible that there is an immediate object of belief 
Q in virtue of which Andrea believes the things she does. We typically identify 
the present time, I suggest, as the time at which we have a total experience of a 
certain character. Let F characterize Andrea’s total experience. Then she 
believes in both S1 and S2 that it is raining at the time at which she has F. but 
the time at which she has F is different in S1 than in S2, so in virtue of this 
immediate belief she had different mediate beliefs in the two situations. 
But even if this strategy works for the present example, it will not always work. 
For consider the following case. Sarah is the subject of a psychological 
experiment. The experimenters have discovered that by means of a particularly 
effective hypnotic technique they can get people to relive experiences they 
have had in the past so exactly that there is no difference at all between the 
original experience and its later counterpart. They explain this carefully to 
Sarah. They tell her that on a cold day in January they will take her into their 
laboratory, hook her up to a variety of devices, and then do nothing but monitor 
her. On a hot day the following July they will take her into the same laboratory, 
hook her up to the same devices, and then recreate exactly the same experience 
she had the previous January. In January, brought into the room and hooked up, 
she thinks: this is the first time that I have had just this experience, but I will 
have it again next July. The following summer, hooked up again, she thinks: 
this is the first time that I have had just this experience, but I will have it again 
next July. Thus if the character of her experience is F, then at each time she 
knows that there are two times at which she has F, but also thinks each time 
that she has never had F before. 
Suppose that at both times Sarah accepts the sentence "It is now cold outside." 
There seems to be no immediate propositional belief on the basis of which she 
accepts this sentence. She does not believe that it is cold outside at the time at 
which she has F, since she believes that there are two such times. Nor does she 
believe that it is cold outside at all times at which she has F, since she believes 
that she has F once when it is hot. She does believe that it is cold outside at 
the first time at which she has F. Does this give her reason to accept ""t is now 
cold outside"" Not unless she also has reason to accept "It is now the first time 
at which I have F." But if she identifies the current moment as the first time at 
which she has F, then it seems that the only propositional basis for accepting 
the latter sentence would be the proposition that the first time at which she has 
F is the first time at which she has F, and this is no help at all. It seems that 
there simply is no propositional belief on the basis of which she accepts the 
sentence "It is now cold outside"; thus, on the revised definition of ‘immediate 
object of belief’ we have been considering, there are not enough immediate 
objects of Sarah’s belief to characterize her belief states completely. 
Let us revert to the official definition of an immediate object of belief, and let 
us take the relevant subjects of belief to be temporal stages of Sarah rather than 
Sarah as a whole. Then we can suggest that in January, the January-stage of 
Sarah immediately believes that she (it?) exists at a time at which it is cold. In 
July, the July-stage of Sarah believes that it exists at a time at which it is cold. 
We now have enough immediate beliefs to fully characterize Sarah’s belief 
state. But too much information, rather than too little, is now captured in the 
immediate objects of one’s belief, so that Sarah’s immediate objects of belief to 
not characterize her belief state essentially. The two Sarah-stages are in exactly 
the same belief state but do not have the same immediate objects of belief.17 
Thus it seems that no matter what set of propositions we term one’s "immediate 
object of belief," it will either fail to characterize one’s belief state essentially 
or it will fail to characterize it completely. Is there anything that does both? The 
account offered by David Lewis and Roderick Chisholm offers hope. I will 
discuss Lewis’s version of this account. 
On Lewis’s view, belief states are characterized not by the propositions we 
immediately believe but by the properties we or our temporal stages "self-
ascribe." In both winter and summer, temporal stages of Sarah self-ascribe the 
property of existing at a time at which it is cold outside. The property may be 
thought of as a set of "centered worlds,"18 in this case worlds centered on a 
person-stage that exists at a time at which it is cold outside. 
When one self-ascribes a property, one thereby believes that one is the center of 
one of the centered worlds in the set that constitutes the property. Thus one 
believes the proposition that one has the property in question. This proposition 
is an immediate object of one’s belief, in my sense, since one believes it in any 
situation in which one is in the same belief state. Again, it is a proposition that 
one believes but does not believe in virtue of believing anything else. We have 
seen that such propositions do no characterize belief states essentially, since 
someone else could be in the same belief state without believing the same 
propositions. If Lewis is correct, however, anyone in the same belief state will 
(immediately) self-ascribe the same properties. 
The transition from the account I have given of the immediate objects of belief 
to the properties that characterize belief states is quite smooth and natural, 
given the account of belief states in section I. On my account, the immediate 
objects of one’s belief are those propositions that one believes in any situation 
in which one is in the same belief state. Call this the "official definition." It is 
instructive to consider the relation between the official definition and an 
alternative that bears some resemblance to what Lewis and Robert Stalnaker 
mean by the term ‘object of belief’. On this second formulation, the total 
immediate object of someone’s belief is the proposition true at all and only 
those worlds in which one is in the same belief state one is actually in and all 
one’s beliefs are true. Call this formulation the "alternative definition." 
The alternative definition sorts most propositions into the immediate/mediate 
categories in the same way the official definition does. Consider first a 
proposition that Ralph believes but that is not an immediate object of his belief: 
the proposition that water fills the lakes. It is not an immediate object of 
Ralph’s belief on the official definition, since Ralph does not believe it in every 
situation in which he is in the same belief state: there are Twin-Earth-type 
situations in which Ralph is in the same belief state but believes rather that 
XYZ fills the lakes. Also it is not an immediate object of Ralph’s belief on the 
alternative definition, for there are worlds in which Ralph is in the same belief 
state he is actually in, and all his beliefs are true, but XYZ rather than water 
fills the lakes. 
Consider next a proposition that is an immediate object of Ralph’s belief. Let 
us suppose that the proposition that ‘Ralph has arthritis in his thigh’ is true is 
such a proposition. If so, it satisfies the official definition – it is a proposition 
that Ralph believes in any situation in which he is in the same belief state. But 
then it also satisfies the alternative definition: if Ralph believes it in every 
world in which he is in the same belief state, then it must be true in every world 
in which he is in the same belief state and all his beliefs are true. 
The strange case of Sarah shows that the official definition does not provide 
enough immediate objects of belief to say what it is about Sarah’s belief state 
that remains the same at the two times at which she has the same experience. 
But Sarah’s case also poses an instructive difficulty for the alternative 
definition: it gives us no clear advice on how to classify certain worlds. 
Consider the world at which Sarah has the same experience at two different 
times. And suppose that in the actual world the experiment failed, so that in fact 
Sarah had the experience in question only once. Is the world in which she had it 
twice a world in which she is in the same belief state and all her beliefs are 
true? It depends on which of the occasions when she was in the same belief 
state we consider. In January she was in the relevant belief state, and all her 
beliefs (let us suppose) were true; whereas in July she was in exactly the same 
belief state, but at least one of her beliefs – the belief that it was cold outside – 
was false. Yet both of these situations are located in the same possible world. 19 
Earlier I compared situations with possible worlds having holes in them. Take 
the possible world we have just been considering: cut out the relevant stage of 
Sarah in January and you get the first situation; cut out the relevant stage of 
Sarah in July and you get the second situation. Plug a Sarah-stage in the 
relevant belief state into situation 1, and you get a Sarah-stage all of whose 
beliefs are true; plug the same Sarah-stage into situation 2, and you get a Sarah-
stage one of whose beliefs is false. 
Situations are similar to the "centered worlds" introduced by Quine and 
discussed by Lewis. Just as there are many centered worlds for each possible 
world, so there are many situations for each possible world. 
The natural move here seems to be to take as basic not possible worlds but 
situations. What characterizes one’s belief state is not the set of possible worlds 
that constitutes one’s total immediate object of belief, but rather the set of 
situations in which all the beliefs of anyone in the same beliefs state one is 
actually in are true. When we first began considering belief states, we found 
that the notions we needed were that of a state of a person and that of a 
situation, which might be regarded as a state of the person’s environment. 
These now seem again to be the notions we need to characterize belief states: 
possible worlds have just gotten in the way. 
The picture that emerges from this discussion is one of belief as a three-tiered 
rather than a two-tiered phenomenon. Instead of having two levels only, those 
of mediate and immediate belief, we have three: mediate belief, immediate 
belief, and self-ascription. We believe the things we believe mediately in virtue 
of believing other things immediately; and some of the things we believe 
immediately, we believe in virtue of self-ascribing properties. 
This can be illustrated as follows. I believe that I am in San Antonio. This is a 
belief in a singular proposition about San Antonio, and so not an immediate 
belief. I believe it in virtue of certain further beliefs: for instance, the belief that 
I am in a town called ‘San Antonio’. This latter proposition may be an 
immediate object of my belief, one I believe but not in virtue of believing 
anything else. Still this proposition does not characterize my belief state 
essentially, since others in the same belief state need not believe the proposition 
that I am in a town called ‘San Antonio’. What characterizes my belief state 
essentially is not the proposition I believe immediately but rather my self-
ascription of the property of living in a town called ‘San Antonio’. 
There is an easy way to derive one’s total self-ascribed property from one’s 
total immediate object of belief. For any person-stage x, we can express x’s 
total immediate object of belief by means of a sentence of the form ‘x is F’. We 
can see this as follows. Some of x’s immediate objects of belief will be 
propositions that x has a certain property; some will be propositions that 
something is the case at a time t; and all will be propositions of some sort or 
other. So all ascriptions of immediate belief will have one or another of the 
following forms: 
x immediately believes that x is F 
x immediately believes that Q at t 
x immediately believes that P. 
The first is already in the desired form. For the second, let F be ‘exists at a time 
at which Q’. All remaining cases have the third form; for them let F be ‘is such 
that P’ or ‘exists in a world in which P’. 
Now, if x’s total immediate object of belief is the proposition that x is F, then, I 
suggest, x’s belief state is essentially and completely characterized by the 
property F, the total property self-ascribed by x. Conversely, if x’s belief state is 
essentially and completely characterized by F, then x’s total immediate object 
of belief is the proposition that x is F. 
IV 
We now have a sketch of an account of belief that takes the notion of an 
immediately self-ascribed property as basic. But this fundamental notion has 
been left somewhat obscure. In particular, we need an account of the relation 
between the intrinsic properties that ground one’s belief state and the property 
that characterizes it. How do the intrinsic facts about me determine the relevant 
property? 
Let us begin by pretending that we are trying to find how one’s intrinsic 
properties determine a set of propositions (the immediate objects of one’s 
belief) rather than of properties. We will be led back to properties soon enough; 
but it is simpler to begin by considering propositions, and the eventual 
modification will be minor. 
The account we now seek would tell us how to get from information about 
someone’s belief state to information about what propositions are immediate 
objects of that person’s belief. Belief states are in this respect analogous to 
sentences. Sentences express (in context) propositions, and a semantics of 
sentences tells us how to get from information about sentences to information 
about the propositions they express. (A compositional semantics will tell us, for 
instance, that ‘P & Q’ is true in any possible world just in case P is true in that 
world and Q is true in that world.) So it may be appropriate to call the account 
we seek a "semantics of belief states." 
This analogy suggests that consideration of semantics proper may help us to 
find the sort of account we need of the immediate objects of belief. It is helpful 
to begin by considering an oversimple picture of the semantics of sentences. 
This picture is sometimes associated with the term ‘procedural semantics’.20 
The picture begins from the idea that the meaning of a sentence is the 
proposition it expresses and that propositions are functions from possible 
worlds to truth values. Sentences mean what people mean by them. So it may 
seem natural to suppose that what a sentence means (for a person) is a function 
from worlds to truth values, a function that the person somehow determines. 
One way to determine such a function would be to be disposed, upon inspection 
of any world, to pronounce the verdict ‘true’ or ‘false’. Consider for instance 
the sentence ‘The earth is round’. On the simple picture, one understands ‘The 
earth is round’ to express the proposition that the earth is round just in case, if 
asked "Is ‘The earth is round’ true?" and shown enough of any possible world, 
one would answer "yes" if the earth were round in that world and "no" 
otherwise. 
Many problems with such a view are immediately apparent. For instance, one 
can’t actually investigate any world but one’s own, and the facts about what 
investigations one pursues are among the facts about that world. But perhaps 
the picture being considered could be captured along these lines: in any 
possible world in which all the facts about one relevant to one’s understand of 
‘The earth is round’ are the same as they actually are, and in which one pursues 
the relevant investigations far enough, one assents to ‘The earth is round’ if the 
earth is round in that world and dissents from it otherwise. If this approach will 
not work, then let us simply indulge in the helpful fiction of the Verne-o-scope, 
a sort of telescope by means of which we can examine as carefully as we like 
possible worlds other than our own.21 
More serious difficulties with the simple picture remain. On such difficulty is 
that we can intend to mean by our expressions propositions that we don’t, and 
know we don’t, internalize. Hilary Putnam intends to use the sentence ‘There 
are elms in North America’ in such a way that he could not, and knows he 
could not, reliably say in all situations whether it was true or not. Most of us 
have similar intentions with regard to sentences containing natural kind terms, 
indexicals, demonstratives, and proper names. We understand any such 
sentence to mean some proposition in particular, but which proposition we 
understand it to mean is not determined by facts solely about us. 
There is a second difficulty, related to but distinct from the first: the simple 
picture assumes that a verificationist theory of meaning is correct – that truth 
conditions for even theoretical sentences depend only on observable facts. This 
seems plainly false. Suppose that I am an expert on elms. I know not only the 
way they appear but also the genetic structure that distinguishes them from 
other trees. I suppose there might be trees that look just like elms but were not. 
But: show me through the Verne-o-scope a world in which there are in North 
America trees that look just like elms, but in which people never evolve and so 
in which there are no microscopes or other technological aids that enhance our 
observational skills. I may well not know whether ‘There are elms in North 
America’ is true or not. Surely this does not show I do not know what 
proposition the sentence expresses. If I were given enough information about 
the world in question, I would know whether the sentence was true. It’s just 
that "enough" information is more than I can glean by unaided observation. But 
if we try to avoid presupposing verificationism by allowing more information 
about the world than observation can provide, how are we to specify how much 
more? If it seems too restrictive to limit the information to the observational, it 
also seems too generous to admit the information that there elms in North 
America,22 and it is not clear how to steer a middle course. 
Now let us return to the immediate objects of belief. A simple proposal similar 
to the simple semantic picture just considered is this: one’s total object of belief 
is a function from worlds to truth values, determined in the following way. The 
worlds that are assigned the value T are those that, upon examination, the 
subject would agree could for all he knew be actual. (Notice that not all the 
worlds the subject would agree could for all he knew be actual will be worlds 
that really are compatible with all his beliefs. I believe that the lakes on earth 
are full of water. But show me a world where they are full of XYZ, and I will 
wrongly claim that it could for all I know be actual. I know more things than I 
realize.) 
Look again at the two criticisms I made of the simple semantic picture. First, 
we can use sentences to mean propositions we haven’t internalized, even ones 
we couldn’t internalize, since we intend social and historical facts to play a role 
in determining what we mean. The same is true of belief: we believe 
propositions we haven’t, or couldn’t, internalize, and for something like the 
same reasons. But nothing of the sort could be true of immediate or direct 
belief. It is no shortcoming of a procedure for determining 
the immediate objects of belief that it finds no place for social or historical 
factors. 
Second, the simple semantic picture is verificationist, whereas any adequate 
semantic theory must not be. But perhaps verificationism is not a fault in a 
semantics of belief states. 
The trouble with verificationism is that many sentences have truth conditions 
that we do not, even could not, have immediate access to. But to be related to a 
proposition in such a way that one does not have immediate access to its truth 
conditions is to be related to it in virtue of features of one that might, had 
matters been different, have related tone to a different proposition. Being 
related to P as things are, and being related to Q as things might have been, are 
indistinguishable from the point of view of the subject. But a proposition that is 
an immediate object of one'’ belief is a proposition one is related to in a way 
that could not relate one to any other proposition. 
Verificationism as a theory of meaning for a public language assumes that there 
has to be too strong a connection between what a sentence or term means and 
what is understood by someone who is able to use it correctly. Putnam and 
others have provided a strong corrective to this view of language. (I do not 
mean to imply that theirs has been the only important criticism of 
verificationism.) But the price is to concede that in a sense we don’t know the 
public meaning of most of the terms we use capably enough. We can’t 
immediately believe anything we can’t completely understand, so the maneuver 
that saves us from verificationism with respect to the public language will not 
save us from verificationism with respect to belief states. 
The account we have been considering, according to which the immediate 
objects of one’s belief are determined by which worlds one would agree could 
be actual, seems able to meet the objections we have so far considered. But a 
more serious one remains: the account requires us not only to have beliefs but 
also to be aware of what they are. Dogs have beliefs, but could hardly assent or 
dissent when presented with alternative possibilities and asked whether they 
might be actual. Perhaps some of our beliefs are like all of a dog’s are in this 
respect. We need a notion of various possible worlds being compatible with a 
subject’s belief state that does not require the subject to have views about 
whether they are or are not so compatible. We need a way to determine what a 
subject’s immediate objects of belief are without supposing that the subject can 
tell us. 
Such a procedure for determining what the immediate objects of someone’s 
(say, Art’s) belief are, given only nonintentional facts about Art, would be a 
method of what has been called "radical interpretation." Much of the literature 
on radical interpretation urges us to adopt one or another "principle of charity": 
assume that Art’s beliefs are mostly true, or that his terms mostly refer, or that 
words mean the same when he uses them as when we do.23 If we want to find 
the immediate objects of Art’s belief, however, we will be careful not to apply 
any such principle. For each of these principles will yield different results in 
different possible situations in which Art himself remains exactly the same. 
Take, for instance, the principle that we should interpret Art in such a way that 
as many of his beliefs as possible come out true. Surely the facts could be 
different than they in fact are, even radically different, in a situation in which 
Art was nevertheless exactly the same; and in such a situation the principle 
would lead us to attribute very different beliefs to Art than we would in the 
actual situation. Since Art’s immediate beliefs remain the same in any situation 
in which Art’s intrinsic properties are the same, this principle of charity will not 
lead us to make the correct attributions of immediate belief to Art. 
We need instead specific instances of the following two general principles: that 
we should attribute those direct beliefs that Art would most likely have been 
led by his experience to acquire; and that we should attribute those direct 
beliefs that would best explain Art’s actions.24 Even these principles will lead to 
the desired results only if they employ descriptions of experience and action 
that are not themselves situation dependent: we shall need to have at hand 
individualistic accounts of perception and action. 
Suppose that there are such principles: principles that will take us from 
complete descriptions of Art’s perceptual input and behavioral output to a 
correct account of his total set of direct beliefs. Then these principles together 
with descriptions of Art’s perceptions and actions provide something like a 
functional account of Art’s total set of immediate objects of belief. Once we 
have this general characterization, we can provide a derivative object-by-object 
account of Art’s immediate beliefs: P is a partial immediate object of Art’s 
belief if and only if there is a Q such that Q is Art’s total immediate object of 
belief, and Q implies P. 
At its simplest, the account I am suggesting may be put, following 
Dennett, 25 like this. The set of worlds at which one’s total immediate object of 
belief is true contains those worlds in which one would be most at home or to 
which one is best adapted: those in which one’s behavior would make the most 
sense and one’s expectations be least thwarted. Which worlds these are is 
determined solely by the intrinsic facts about one, so the appropriate set will 
not differ with differences in one’s environment alone. And this account should 
make it seem plausible that there are immediate objects of belief, since it 
should be clear that there will be worlds to which one is especially well 
adapted. 
But now we are in a position to see the need for a modification we have been 
expecting from the start. Is there really a set of worlds to which Art is best 
adapted? I am reasonably well adapted to the world I am currently in – 
provided that I am located toward the end of the twentieth century. Were I in 
precisely the same intrinsic state, but located in the twelfth century, however, I 
would be disastrously ill adapted. Again, if I were in my present intrinsic state 
but located on Venus, I would be ill adapted. What I am well or ill adapted to, 
then, are situations rather than worlds. To characterize my belief state, we need 
to consider the set of situations to which I am best adapted. 
As noted earlier, a set of situations, like a set of centered worlds, corresponds 
not to a proposition but to a property: the property one has if and only if one 
is in one of those situations. One’s total self-ascribed property is, then, the 
property of being in one of the situations to which one is in fact best adapted. 
For any person x, if x is in the belief state characterized by property F, then x’s 
total immediate object of belief is the proposition that x is F. 
We have now seen how one’s intrinsic properties determine one’s total self-
ascribed property and how one’s total self-ascribed property k, together with 
who (and when) one is, determines one’s total immediate object of belief. Thus, 
to complement the neutral answer to my title question given in section I, we 
have a sketch of a more substantive answer. To do more would be to go beyond 
the bounds of the present paper. 
But I see this account of belief states as forming part of a larger account of 
belief proper. Our ordinary or mediate beliefs are propositions we believe in 
virtue of our immediate beliefs, together with facts about our environment. If 
the dependence of mediate on immediate belief is systematic, it should be 
possible to find the principles that govern it; it should be possible, that is, to 
give an account of belief in general in terms of immediate belief and contextual 
factors. Such an account would resemble Alvin Goldman’s account of action in 
general in terms of basic actions and "level generation."26 I believe that such an 
account is possible, but this is not the place to provide it.27 
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